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29 May 1946

JOINT TOPOGRAPHICAL SUBCOMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 17

SURVEY JOINT ARMY-NAVY INTELLIGENCE STUDIES (JANIS)

Note by the Secretary

As directed by JIC 306/8/M, the Joint Topographical Subcommittee is conducting a survey of JANIS users, requesting comment on the value of JANIS and recommendations as to its improvement and the desirability of retaining JANIS as a post-war publication.

Replies to a letter of inquiry, drafted by the JTS and forwarded to appropriate service commands through the Directors of Intelligence having representatives on the JTS, are now being correlated and evaluated.

Enclosures "A" and "B", two of the replies received to date, are deemed of sufficient interest to be circulated for information in advance of the response to JIC 306/8/M.

F. R. ALEXANDER,
Secretary.

JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

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ENCLOSURE "A"

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief

A8-2

Serial 3318

18 March 1946

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Comments on the value of JANIS.

Reference: (a) CNO serial 1051P23 of 20 Feb 1946.

1. As requested in reference (a) the following specific replies to the questions in paragraph 3 are submitted:

(a) Joint Army Navy Intelligence Studies were of great value in the planning and conduct of operations.

(b) The studies were used for basic research in developing information on areas.

(c) The information contained in them was of great value.

(d) The studies are considered to be of the correct scope for their purpose.

(e) The form of presentation is excellent. No basic changes should be made. Recommended changes are set forth in the following paragraphs.

2. In the intelligence library of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, JANIS are the basic research publications for all areas which they cover. The chapter headings are well suited for military studies. Subsequent information from O.N.I., however, is usually classified in accordance with the O.N.I. Index Guide, which requires considerable revision to meet the needs of modern warfare. As a result, the current information on an area is contained in several volumes and files in addition to the pertinent JANIS. This is a serious disadvantage, in view of the rapidity with which areas of paramount interest are now developing.

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3. In order to allow field activities optimum benefit of available intelligence information it is recommended:

(a) That a uniform up to date index system be devised and urged for adoption by all United States intelligence agencies.

(b) That the publication of JANIS be vigorously continued, with priorities changes as indicated by world conditions.

(c) That corrections to JANIS of critical areas be prepared and promptly disseminated in the same form as the original sheets. A universal index system would make this possible directly from intelligence reports with a minimum of additional research and editing.

(d) That progress reports, in the form of world charts, showing status of JANIS and other studies completed, projected and under revision, be distributed quarterly to holders of JANIS.

4. To summarize - JANIS are excellent, but the means of keeping them up to date are inadequate. This could be best accomplished by the adoption of a universal index system and by a continuing critical consideration of priorities of JANIS and corrections thereto.

D. B. DUNCAN

Chief of Staff

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ENCLOSURE "B"

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER

CE 319.1 (18 Apr 46) I

APO 500
18 April 1946

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies

TO: Chief of Engineers, War Department, Washington 25, D.C.
ATTENTION: Chief Military Intelligence Division.

1. Reference is made to your letter, above subject, dated 26 February 1946. The attached review of Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS), by Colonel H. G. Schenck, represents the view of the agency charged with the preparation of engineer intelligence reports in connection with the New Guinea and Philippines operations and the anticipated operations against the mainland of Japan. This review leads to the conclusion that JANIS was timely and valuable; and offers the following recommendations for improvement:

- a. Elimination of conflicting and contradictory features.
- b. Expansion of Chapter I to a fully integrated overall summary of the remainder of the study.
- c. Inclusion of references and estimates of reliability.
- d. Utilization of specialists only in the preparation of all elements of the studies.

2. The following comments represent the views of the undersigned, derived from experience, both in the preparation of certain chapters of JANIS, the actual use of these studies and other intelligence reports in the planning of engineer operations in the field, and in the extension of these studies by theater resources. In this connection it would appear pertinent to submit a general appraisal of terrain intelligence as required for military operations.

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3. Theoretically, at least, intelligence data should be available to the planning agencies concerned with military operations, in the following order:

a. Broad studies at National Defense level to serve as basis for overall strategy.

b. Technical and terrain studies at National Defense level relating to the features affecting operations in the given area.

c. Theater level studies of a general nature based on a above, expanded and modified by theater experience and information to serve as a guide in the application of resources.

d. Detailed feature analyses at theater level in extension of b above, based upon the latest information available.

e. Further extensions of c and d by the tactical commands charged with the actual conduct of operations.

4. As far as is known to the undersigned, no broad studies of the character indicated in paragraph 3a above were prepared for use of the major strategic staffs during the course of the war. No doubt individual studies of this character were prepared, however, by the Joint Intelligence and Joint Logistic Committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It may be argued that such broad intelligence studies upon which the major strategic conceptions are based in part, cannot be prepared with assurance without the benefit of detailed research, the result of which would appear eventually in comprehensive reports such as JANIS. Major strategy, however, is seldom governed by local conditions. For example, had the Joint Chiefs of Staff been aware of, or concerned with, climatological conditions and construction and transportation difficulties involved in the Leyte Operation, the operation might not have been authorized. It may be assumed that the elements of broad strategy will continue to be governed by generalized appraisals which may be made without intensive research.

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5. The exact place of JANIS in the scheme of intelligence studies is difficult to establish. While I do not have a copy of the JANIS charter, it is my assumption from the nature of the contents, that the following represent its objectives:

a. To inform the strategic planners as to physical and economic features of a given area in sufficient detail to permit a fair appraisal of the military task involved in as far as the task is affected by these features.

b. To provide supply and technical services sufficient data by which major decisions as to technique, transportation, construction and allied matters may be made.

c. To provide to the major tactical command concerned, background data as far as available at National Defense level, as a springboard from which it may take off in pursuit of greater detail.

6. As actually prepared, JANIS appears to have attempted to take a middle ground between the broad general study required by the strategic planner and the detailed feature analysis required by the technical services and the tactical commands. The features having a pronounced effect upon supply, equipment, training and techniques must be analysed in maximum detail, and at an appropriate time, by experts thoroughly familiar with their subject and with the requirements of their prospective customers. Most of the information required is strictly factual and must be so reported. The accuracy of the work depends upon the quality of the source material available to the analyst and his capacity to select, appraise and reconcile inconsistent and contradictory data. JANIS was an attempt to present these data in consolidated and sometimes abbreviated form. That attempt resulted from the inescapable conclusion that independent studies by various Army and Navy intelligence agencies were introducing many duplications, rivalries in the acquisition of source materials and

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inconsistent conclusions. Further, such independent studies prepared without overall guidance not only made it impossible to assemble a complete picture at any one time, but also required all using agencies to assemble and consult a tremendous mass of references. JANIS was late entering the intelligence field, its direction by the Joint Intelligence Committee of J.C.S. was inadequate and its formation was makeshift arrangement to coordinate independent agencies already well organized and embarked on independent programs. The staff assembled for JANIS was not competent to appraise the contributions of the agencies to which were assigned various elements of the studies, nor to reconcile inconsistencies in reports; hence it became primarily an editing and publishing agency. The excellent format of the publications gave them an air of competence and stability, inspiring a confidence not always justified.

7. In order that the objectives of JANIS as set forth above may be attained, it is necessary first, that the staff responsible for their preparation receive positive direction by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or comparable authority at National Defense level as to areas to be covered, priorities and time schedules. The actual collection, analysis and publication for such studies may proceed by either of two methods:

a. Through the operation of similar intelligence agency at National Defense level made up of experts of all essential categories. Such an organization has strength in mass production, in the elimination of competition for source material and in the elimination of duplication and inconsistencies. It has a disadvantage in its inability to meet rapid changes in plans or to provide spot information of vital interest to one or a few planning agencies. Further, the selection of personnel for such a dominant intelligence agency will be greatly hampered by the reluctance of interested agencies to

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release competent experts. The centralization of detailed intelligence studies runs the further risk of misdirection into selected channels based on the backgrounds and pre-dominant interests of the key personnel.

b. A supervisory and coordinating staff at National Defense level with individual elements of the studies assigned to the agencies of primary interest. This procedure was adopted by JANIS. If properly organized and furnished adequate direction and support, such an organization has the advantage of insuring intelligence experts and of permitting greater flexibility in their employment. The disadvantage of duplication and contradiction are apparent but can be largely eliminated by close supervision and cooperation. The major danger in such an organization is diversion of effort at the changing whims of the individual research agencies, i.e. concentration on immediate problems to the neglect of long range objectives.

8. Of the two methods indicated, I would choose the latter, i.e., research and preparation by the agencies of primary interest; direction, supervision, publication and distribution by a centralized agency at National Defense level. For such an organization to be effective, there must be:

- a. Positive direction.
- b. Rigid assignment of subjects and enforcement of directives.
- c. Firm time schedules for original preparation and revision.
- d. Consistent and competent supervision from the National Defense level.

Such an organization must be equipped with a full time staff.

9. Summary. These remarks are not extended to include intelligence studies at theater and lower levels, a subject which

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is closely related to studies such as JANIS. The major factor in the concentration and conservation of effort on essentials of intelligence is the element of time. Theoretically a planning directive passed from higher to lower levels should be accompanied by a summary of intelligence data plus references to completed studies. In general, this procedure did not prove practicable during the war, since as a rule, planning directives were issued while the pertinent intelligence data was still in course of preparation. This leads to the conclusion that intelligence data necessary to support a planning directive cannot be prepared from scratch during the course of military operations.

10. Conclusions.

a. The preparation of joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies on the order of JANIS should be a normal peace time function at the National Defense level.

b. Contents of such studies should accord in general with JANIS with the exceptions that:

(1) All subjects should be treated as exhaustively as the character and availability of source materials will permit.

(2) Strictly military features (strength, compositions, equipment, tactics and technique) of foreign military forces are not proper elements of this type of study.

(3) Sources of information should be fully documented and appraised.

(4) A brief or summary (Chapter I) treating on subjects of the study with equal emphasis should be prepared for the use of strategic planners at the National Defense level.

c. The organization charged with the preparation of such studies should be under the direct supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and should operate on a 100% basis.

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d. The various features should be assigned to those elements of the National Defense organization having primary interest, under strict directives as to priorities, time schedules, scope, coordination and revision.

e. Manuscripts should be maintained in loose leaf form ready for assembling and publication at any time.

For the Chief Engineer:

/s/
HERBERT B. LOPER
Brigadier General, CE
Chief Engr. Intel. Div.

1 Incl:
Incl 1 - Review of JANIS by
Col. H. G. Schenck

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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE "B"

HGS/TAH/jm

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No. NR 319.1 (2 Apr 46) MC SUBJECT: Comments on JANIS Reports

From: Natural Resources Section To: OCE Date: 2 April 1946

1. Introduction.

a. This memorandum was prepared by the Natural Resources Section in response to a request from the Engineer Intelligence Division, Office of the Chief Engineer, AFPAC, for comments on the value of the Joint Army Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS) as used in the preparation of Engineer Terrain Intelligence during the war and occupation, and in making plans for the appraisal and control of Japan's natural resources.

b. The purpose of the JANIS Studies is stated to be to "provide basic background data". This is also the mission of the Civil Affairs Handbooks published by the Army and Navy, but in practice there is not a great deal of overlap. The Civil Affairs Handbooks provide as many precise detailed data as possible on the region covered, with emphasis on economic data, and they are extremely useful as reference works; the JANIS Studies on the other hand provide an over-all picture of the region, with emphasis on the geographical point of view. The two series of publications thus supplement each other well. It is assumed in this memorandum that the purpose of the JANIS Studies is mainly to provide such an over-all picture; they were used in this way as background in the preparation of Engineer

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Intelligence in the Pacific theatre, and to a lesser extent in Natural Resources planning.

c. As all the JANIS Studies are built on the same plan, these remarks are intended to apply generally, but the memorandum is based principally on experience with the Studies covering Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. The memorandum was written by Mr. J. Rodgers of the Natural Resources Section. The section on Use in Natural Resources Planning is based primarily on statements of the experience of the several divisions of the Natural Resources Section in planning for the occupation of Japan. The section on use in Engineer Intelligence is based on Mr. Rodgers' nine months work with the Engineer Terrain Intelligence Team attached to the Engineer, POA, but he has had the benefit of many criticisms from Mr. L. W. Stach, of the Natural Resources Section, who served for more than three years in the Engineer Intelligence Division, Office of the Chief Engineer for AFPAC, SWPA, and the predecessors of those commands, and had many opportunities to observe the use of the Studies in the field. Although the following notes are mostly critical, they are not intended to disparage the Studies but only to suggest means of improving them.

2. Use in Natural Resources Planning.

a. The material on natural resources in the JANIS Studies is found largely in Chapter IX, Resources and Trade, though some is scattered elsewhere (e.g. Vegetation and Water Supply in Chapter II).

b. The appraisal and control of natural resources in an occupied country requires more detail than can be expected of a report on the regional scale of the JANIS Studies, but planning such work beforehand, as was done before the occupation of Japan, requires just such a regional summary.

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Even for this, the details on resources in the Studies were meagre, especially in forestry and agriculture, and the geographical point of view entirely out-weighed the economic. Moreover, a large part of the material was not compiled by technically trained men and hence was not critically evaluated. In general summary reports prepared by civilian agencies of the U. S. Government were found to be more accurate and useful.

3. Use in Engineer Terrain Intelligence.

a. The first part of this section of the memorandum consists of comments on the several chapters of the JANIS Studies most used in the preparation of Engineer Terrain Intelligence; the second part consists of more general remarks.

b. Chapter II, Military Geography, adequately serves its general purpose of providing a broad regional picture. However, it is commonly difficult to locate answers to specific questions in the long running paragraphs of the text. If the text were broken up into shorter paragraphs on single subjects or even tabulated, and if it were more immediately tied to maps, perhaps by describing the characters of given map units in the text, it would be more usable. Large scale maps would also be desirable, though admittedly the format would make them difficult.

c. Chapter III, Oceanography, and Chapter V, Climate and Weather, contain a great mass of useful data, though the data in Chapter V are slanted so entirely toward Air Corps requirements that it is occasionally difficult to extract information needed by the Engineers. Those sections of the Brief, Chapter I, which correspond to those chapters provide good summary generalizations of these data. It is suggested that these summaries would be very useful as

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introductions within the respective chapters, for a person looking for general information on Climate and Weather, for example, will turn direct to that chapter rather than to the Brief.

d. The data in Chapter IV, Coasts and Landing Beaches, are valuable but poorly organized. The chapter consists of two separate and unintegrated parts, which alternate in a confusing manner. It is thus difficult to find the text describing a given stretch of coast. One part, coasts, is mostly copies from the Navy Coast Pilots, and does not improve on them in any way. The other parts, beaches, is excellent as far as it goes, but it covers only a few segments of coast (the tabular form adopted in one recent JANIS (75) is useful and permits coverage of more beaches than the older paragraph form). The two parts should be written by a single set of authors, and should be integrated by reducing the coast section to interpolations between the beach descriptions and by slanting it more directly to landing problems.

e. Chapter VI, Port Facilities, is a good and factual study prepared by technical experts. Chapter VII, Transportation and Telecommunications, is similar but with much less detail. Chapter VIII, Cities and Towns, is adequate and useful.

f. The remaining chapters are of less direct concern to Engineer Intelligence, though they contain much valuable information. Chapter XV, Gazetteer and Map Appraisal, is especially to be commended.

g. Chapter I, the Brief, consists of abstracts of each of the other chapters and exhibits one of the principal flaws of the Studies, their lack of integration. Most of the sections of the brief are simply condensed versions of the corresponding chapters with no generalizations to compensate for the omissions. It is doubtful that such shorter

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statements will ever be used in preference to the full statements. On the other hand, Section 1 of the Brief gives a valuable short summary of the region not to be found elsewhere in the Study. It is recommended therefore that the Brief be replaced by a fully integrated over-all summary which would be in effect an expansion of the present Section 1.

h. The lack of integration visible in the Brief extends throughout the Studies and results in flat contradictions between various chapters. This was probably unavoidable under war conditions, which required quick preparation and quick distribution above everything else, but it should be eliminated in the future.

i. Another cause for unevenness in the chapters is that some are compiled by technically qualified experts and others are not. For example, Chapter VI is compiled by men trained in port and harbor engineering, but the sections on water supply systems in Chapters VIII and IX are not written by hydraulic engineers and commonly show serious errors. It may be that technical experts were not always available, but it would have been less misleading to omit a subject entirely rather than to treat it badly.

j. Another serious flaw in the Studies is the uniform positiveness of the statements, even in a single chapter. For the most part, it is impossible to tell from the text whether the given statement is certain fact, probable fact, or debatable opinion, but the implication is that all statements are equally accurate. As a result, the discovery of a few errors in one section undermines all confidence in the Studies. But since the data must vary greatly in value, it is the duty of the compiler to indicate the relative value of his statements. This can be accomplished by proper

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qualifications of the positive statements, for example by using reliability ratings such as those given for the Landing Beaches in Chapter IV. This is especially to be desired where, as with the Landing Beaches, the statements are not merely compilations but independent conclusions from the available data. In addition, a frank listing and appraisal of the sources from which the materials have been compiled and of the methods used in compiling them, will commonly help the reader in evaluating the statements. The bibliographies now at the ends of the chapters could be expanded into a thorough summary of sources of material.

k. In general the illustrations to the text are good; the use of aerial photographs where available is especially to be commended. The maps are almost all well drawn and readable, but sometimes carry less information than they might; for example, factories or mines are often located by prefecture or province only. It would be helpful if locations could be as precise as possible and carefully checked. All folded maps should have titles on the outside in a conspicuous place; this has been done on many.

l. The trend in the Studies toward shorter paragraphs and more tables is good and should be continued. The sacrifice in literary style and the increase in work for the editors and printers is more than outweighed by the greater usefulness of the material so presented.

4. Conclusions.

a. There is no question that the JANIS Studies have served a very useful purpose during the war, and their usefulness has been greatly enhanced by the wide distribution they have had, which is in contrast to most of the other intelligence prepared in Washington, especially Army intelligence. The Studies can serve an equally useful purpose during the peace, for they permit the compilation into one report of material

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from many scattered and frequently inaccessible sources. Studies of this sort should be extended over as many areas as possible; the less that is known about an area the more value such a compilation will have. For example, JANIS Studies of the North and South Polar regions would fill a real vacancy in present intelligence.

b. As regards the number of subjects covered, no great expansion or contraction is indicated; however, certain topics, such as natural resources, should be covered more fully. With more time available than during the war, the best technical assistance can be obtained, the material can be evaluated and interpreted, and the several parts of the study can be integrated. As a general rule, each chapter should include a mass of organized detail, the more the better within the limits of the format, together with a summary section consisting not only of text but also including a fairly large scale annotated map tied to the text. Tabular form should be used wherever possible, both in the detailed portions and in the summaries.

/s/
H.G.S.